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Following the Right Lead:
Gutnick and the Dance of Internet Jurisdiction
Mary Paterson

Jurisdiction and the Internet

nature of the tort. It is this approach that Canadian
courts should adopt. 3

A

s improving methods of travel and communication
facilitated the shift from an agrarian to an industrial
society, the common law courts increasingly faced
interjurisdictional disputes. Although British paternalism
dominated early cases in which courts assumed jurisdiction over people, property, and actions in distant lands,
these cases and the imperial attitudes informing them
were slowly replaced by more modest jurisdictional
assertions based on a sense of comity. 1 The shift from an
industrial society to an information-based society and
the simultaneous growth of a global infrastructure based
on satellite, telephone, cable, and cellular technologies
have stretched jurisdictional doctrines in new ways,
calling into question traditional methods of balancing
the interests of nations in protecting and regulating their
citizens. For example, the Internet allows people to
broadcast defamatory statements to an international
audience without setting a physical or, as some would
argue, an electronic foot outside of their home forum. In
such a situation, is it just for a foreign court to assume
jurisdiction over the defendant who may have adhered
to local law and been unaware of foreign law? On the
other hand, is it just to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over
a defendant who may have adhered to a local law that
did not reflect the common attitude towards defamation, thereby leaving all reputations vulnerable to foreign
attack? Canadian appeal courts have not yet addressed
this jurisdictional question in the context of the Internet,
although courts of all levels have struggled with the
growth of interjurisdictional activity in contract and tort.
However, as the Internet grows and its uses multiply, the
courts will increasingly face the difficult jurisdictional
issues raised by Internet activity. Thus, Canada must
choose the approach it will apply.
The High Court of Australia addressed this choice
in Dow Jones v. Gutnick. 2 Dow Jones published defamatory statements about Joseph Gutnick in Barron’s Online
on its subscription Web site. Gutnick brought an action
against Dow Jones in Victoria, Australia, for damage to
his reputation in Australia. Although Dow Jones urged
the Court to adopt the single publication rule for finding
jurisdiction over defamation on the Internet, a rule that
exists in the United States, the Court rejected that rule,
instead forging the different approach of focusing on the

Current Canadian Law

O

ne factor in choosing an approach to jurisdiction
and the Internet is the existing jurisdictional law in
Canada. Canadian courts have jurisdiction if the parties
are served in the forum, if the parties submit to jurisdiction, or if the suit falls under a service ex juris rule and
has a real and substantial connection with the jurisdiction. Even when the court has jurisdiction through one
of these methods, the court can decline to hear the case
based on the court’s power to control its own process
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine has been relaxed, making it easier for defendants to
convince courts not to assume jurisdiction to compensate for the increasing breadth of service ex juris rules.
The substantial connection test also restrains courts from
asserting jurisdiction under service ex juris rules. The test
derives from De Savoye v. Morguard Investments Ltd., 4
in which the Supreme Court of Canada stated that provincial courts should enforce the judgments of other
provincial courts where those courts assumed jurisdiction in an appropriately restrained manner consistent
with order and fairness. According to the Court, order
and fairness necessitated a substantial connection
between the jurisdiction and some part of the suit. This
requirement now extends to foreign judgments. 5
The substantial connection test in Morguard does
not explain what the jurisdiction must be connected
with. The Supreme Court refers to the subject matter of
the action, damages suffered, the defendant, and the subject matter of the suit. The Ontario Court of Appeal
articulated eight factors, including the connection
between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim, the connection between the forum and the defendant, unfairness to
the defendant, unfairness to the plaintiff, the involvement of other parties in the suit, the Court’s willingness
to enforce foreign judgments rendered on the same jurisdictional basis, whether the case is inter-provincial or
international in nature, and global standards of comity
and jurisdiction. 6 Both Courts focus on broad connections that balance parties’ interests; this focus differs from
the American due process approach, which constitution49

50
ally requires that the jurisdiction have some minimal
contacts with the defendant, regardless of the other factors. Despite this difference, Canadian courts seem to
look to American jurisprudence for assistance with jurisdiction over Internet activities.
The British Columbia courts are the first to have
applied the substantial connection test to Internet
activity. In Braintech Inc. v. Kostiuk, 7 the Court of Appeal
addressed whether or not to enforce a Texas default
judgment obtained by a British Columbia company
against a British Columbia resident in a defamation suit.
The defendant posted defamatory statements on an
Internet bulletin board. Because the plaintiff traded its
stock over the Internet, it claimed that its reputation was
harmed in Texas, where people could read the comments and decline to purchase stock. The Court of
Appeal refused to enforce the judgment, stating that
Texas did not have a substantial connection with the
suit. However, it relied heavily on American Internet
cases, including Zippo Manufacturing Company v.
Zippo Dot Com Inc. 8 In Zippo, the District Court of
Pennsylvania stated that a court could not assert jurisdiction over a defendant where that defendant operated a
passive Web site, because that defendant would not have
sufficient contacts with the jurisdiction to satisfy the constitutional due process clause. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal characterized the bulletin board as a
passive site on which Kostiuk did not engage in commercial activity; as such, Texas did not have jurisdiction.
The adoption of the interactivity test is problematic
for two reasons. First, the Canadian substantial connection test does not assess whether or not the foreign
forum has assumed jurisdiction correctly under its own
laws; rather, the test focuses on whether there is a substantial connection, as defined by Canadian jurisprudence, between the suit and the foreign jurisdiction.
Therefore, American due process and minimal contacts
cases cannot assist a Canadian court’s assessment of substantial connection. Second, by relying on the interactivity test, the Court of Appeal has imported a defendantoriented test based on the American Constitution into
the Canadian context, contrary to the more balanced
Canadian approach outlined above.
Some cases contradict Braintech’s adoption of
Zippo; however, these cases also rely on American jurisprudence. In Easthaven Ltd. v. Nutrisystem.com Inc., 9 the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice specifically adopted
Panavision International v. Toeppen, 10 a case in which
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used the
effects test instead of the interactivity test. The Easthaven
Court made the same error that was made in Braintech,
using the American cases to refuse jurisdiction in
Canada. However, in Pro-C Ltd. v. Computer City Inc., 11
the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned a trial judgment
relying on Zippo and Braintech in the trademark context. The Court of Appeal found that the American
defendant had not used the trademark within the statu-
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tory meaning, and thus had neither infringed the mark
nor caused any damage. Although the Court does not
specifically reject the interactivity test, instead relying on
a narrow interpretation of the Trade-mark Act 12 to find
for the defendant, in obiter, the Court suggests that ‘‘it is
much more sensible to apply tort principles to accommodate new technologies’’. 13 The Australian High Court
applied precisely this approach in Gutnick.

Australian and American
Approaches

I

n four concurring judgments, the Australian High
Court rendered a unanimous decision that the proposed single publication rule was inappropriate, Victoria
had jurisdiction over the defamation suit, and Victorian
law applied to the case. Dow Jones argued that the
Internet is a novel medium necessitating a new way of
locating the place of the tort. The place of the tort is
important in Australia, and in Canada, because service ex
juris rules allow courts to take jurisdiction over torts
committed in that jurisdiction, and because the place of
the tort determines choice of law which affects a forum
non conveniens decision. Thus, the location of the tort
critically impacts whether or not the court has jurisdiction and whether or not that court will choose to exercise jurisdiction by rejecting a forum non conveniens
argument.
Dow Jones argued that the Court should adopt the
single publication rule 14 to assess the place of the tort in
defamation suits. The single publication rule states that
plaintiffs can bring only one claim for damage in all
jurisdictions caused by defamatory statements, and that
the place of publication is the place in which the material is first comprehensible. Therefore, the place of the
tort in Internet defamation is the place at which the
information is uploaded onto a server. If the server is the
place of publication, then the law of that place governs
the publication. Dow Jones argued that such a result is
just, because the Internet is a passive medium such that
the publisher has little control over the location of its
readership, and that a single governing law leads to certainty and fairness. Under this rule, the defamatory statements in Gutnick were published on a New Jersey
server, New Jersey law would apply, and Victoria would
not have jurisdiction under the service ex juris rules or
under a forum non conveniens analysis. Although the
single publication rule has benefits, 15 Dow Jones conceded that where the location of the server was opportunistic, the Court could apply a different analysis to find
the place of the tort.
The Court unanimously rejected this proposal. All
judges except for Justice Kirby rejected the idea that the
Internet is a novel medium. Justices Gleeson, McHugh,
Gummow, and Hayne proceeded to reject the single
publication rule because the rule was unclear, particu-
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larly given the ambiguity of the exceptions for opportunistic or adventitious behaviour. Furthermore, these justices stated that the convenience of the poster of material
must be balanced with the convenience of the plaintiff
and the differing balances struck between free speech
and protection of reputations in different nations. They
stated, ‘‘Certainty does not necessarily mean singularity’’. 16 Finally, the Court pointed out that the development of the single publication rule from a jurisdictional
doctrine to a doctrine governing choice of law occurred
in the United States to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, a
constitutional requirement that applied to criminal and
not to civil matters. Justice Gaudron concurred with this
analysis, adding the contention that the single publication rule was developed to prevent a multiplicity of suits
and that estoppel doctrines were sufficient to protect
parties from multiple suits. Justice Callinan concurred,
stating that the adoption of the single publication rule
would lead to ‘‘an American legal hegemony in relation
to Internet publications’’, 17 because most servers are
located in the United States.
Justice Kirby concurred in the result but not in the
analysis. He alone concluded that the Internet was more
than a mere extension of existing communications
media, and that a change in the rules was required. However, he found that such a change was beyond judicial
capacity. Not only did Justice Kirby rely on the longstanding history of defamation law including the multiple publication rule, but he also pointed to Australian
legislation premised on the existence of the multiple
publication rule. Furthermore, he stated that if a nation
takes legislative initiative to deal with a problem, as Australia was doing at the time of the decision, then the
judiciary does not have the capacity to remedy that same
problem. Finally, Justice Kirby pointed to the flaws
inherent in Dow Jones’ proposed rule, including the ease
of manipulation, the ambiguity of the exceptions, the
difficulty that plaintiffs would have locating the server,
the power imbalance in defamation actions that would
accrue to the United States, and the lack of technological
neutrality in the rule.
In adopting the multiple publication rule — a rule
which states that every new publication of a defamatory
statement, such that another reader or listener understands the statement, gives rise to a new claim — the
Australian Court made an important statement about
finding jurisdiction in Internet cases concerning torts
and, through its lack of discussion, about the value of
American jurisdictional jurisprudence. All members of
the Court stated that when determining the place of the
tort, courts should examine the factors in the context of
the tort in question because the nature of the tort alters
where that tort occurs. Therefore, in the case of defamation, the Court found that the tort arose when damage
occurred or where the reputation was injured. In
Gutnick, damage occurred in Victoria; therefore, the
assertion of jurisdiction was appropriate. As both the
majority and Justice Kirby pointed out, the nature of the
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tort reduces the number of jurisdictions in which litigants can bring a suit. For example, Gutnick could only
claim damage in Victoria (the jurisdiction in which he
lived), Israel (the jurisdiction in which he completed
charitable works), and the United States (the jurisdiction
in which he completed some business transactions).
Only in these jurisdictions did Gutnick have a reputation to injure. Thus, the spectre of liability in every jurisdiction raised by Dow Jones, like most spectres, is fictitious.
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that issues of
jurisdiction and choice of law must be decided separately. Although the Victorian Court might rightly
assume jurisdiction over Gutnick’s suit in its entirety,
assuming that he claimed damage to his reputation in
Israel and the United States as well, the Victorian Court
could not correctly apply Victorian law to the entire suit.
Rather, using the place of the tort as the place of damage
to the reputation, the Victorian Court would apply Victorian, American, and Israeli law to assess the damage to
Gutnick’s reputation in the different nations. Thus,
Gutnick would have succeeded in his Victorian claim
and failed in his American claim. The inconsistent result
does not point to an ineffective rule; rather it reveals a
rule that is sensitive to the different values placed on free
speech and protection of reputation in different countries. The inconsistent result is consistent with the principles of comity that inform jurisdictional principles in
Australia and in Canada.
Not only did the Australian Court approach the
jurisdictional issue through the lens of established torts,
but it also failed to consider the jurisdictional tests developed in the United States. This omission, particularly
given Dow Jones’ discussion of the American due process
guarantee 18 and the minimal contacts approach, at a
minimum suggests that the Court thought the American
jurisdictional approach to be irrelevant in the Australian
context. Not only should Canadian courts follow the
Australians in adopting a tort-based jurisdictional analysis, but they should also find the American jurisprudence to be irrelevant to Canadian law. Before such a
proposition can be supported, however, I must explore
the effects and the interactivity tests.
Both tests fit within the American jurisdictional
framework found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts
can assert general or specific jurisdiction under the longarm statutes of each state. General jurisdiction exists
where the defendant has continuous activities in the
state, creating jurisdiction over all claims related to that
defendant. This situation rarely arises in the context of
the Internet. Specific jurisdiction exists where the defendant purposefully avails itself of the forum, where the
claim arises as a result of the defendant’s forum-related
activities, and where the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Many long-arm statutes allow jurisdictional assertions to the extent that the Constitution permits such an
assertion. Therefore, the due process analysis is critical. In
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International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 19 the United
States Supreme Court established a two-part test for due
process, requiring that the defendant have minimum
contacts with the forum state, such that maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice. 20 The flexibility of this standard
‘‘permits a court to respond to technical and social
change and better protect the forum state’s residents
from novel issues that arise from new media such as the
internet (sic)’’. 21 Generally, the courts assess the minimal
contacts requirement through the lens of purposeful
availment by the defendant. It is only at the stage of
assessing reasonableness that the court considers factors
such as the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient
relief and the nation’s interest in promoting a certain
social policy. However, jurisdiction rarely founders on
the reasonableness assessment, because modes of travel
and communication, particularly within the United
States, are relatively cheap and easy to access. 22 As a
result, even where a plethora of factors support the
assumption of jurisdiction, unlike a Canadian court, the
American court will refuse such jurisdiction if the defendant does not have sufficient minimal contacts with the
state.
In an attempt to analyse minimal contacts on the
Internet, the District Court of Pennsylvania developed
the interactivity test in Zippo. Under this test, the court
analyses the activity level of a Web site and classifies it as
a passive site, an active site, or an intermediate site. If the
site is passive, such that the publisher merely places
information on that site, then the foreign court cannot
assert jurisdiction. If the site is active, such that the publisher solicits business from the foreign jurisdiction,
enters into contracts with and delivers goods to the
inhabitants of the forum, and generally conducts business there, then jurisdiction is appropriate. However,
where the Web site is in between these two extremes,
the court must look for ‘‘something more’’ 23 than just a
Web site to found jurisdiction. As the Court in Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King 24 points out, this requirement
for something more usually derives from the long-arm
statute as well as the due process requirement.
The interactivity test, although still applied, has
been severely criticized. First, ‘‘substantial technological
improvements’’ 25 have practically eliminated the passive
Web site. Therefore, the non-technology-neutral nature
of the test renders it of little value in the long term.
Furthermore, ‘‘passive’’ does not always equate to a lack
of purposeful availment. In the case of defamation, a
defendant could post defamatory material on a technologically passive site with the explicit intent of injuring
the defamed person’s reputation in a specific jurisdiction.
Under the Zippo test, the defendant would escape liability. More problems arise in the intermediate category.
The ‘‘something more’’ requirement simply forces courts
to return to traditional cases to assess purposeful availment, rendering the Zippo test of little analytical value.
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Finally, the active Web site also fails to serve as an appropriate proxy for jurisdiction. As Michael Geist points out,
While the active Web site may want to sell into every jurisdiction, the foreseeability of a legal action is confined primarily to those places where actual sales occur. The Zippo test
does not distinguish between actual and potential sales. 26

These failings in the Zippo test have caused some American courts and scholars to return to traditional
approaches to jurisdiction. 27 One such approach is the
effects test, which was first articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones. 28 In Calder, the
Court found that California courts could assume jurisdiction over a defamation suit, despite the fact that the
defamatory newspaper was printed in Florida, because
the defendant engaged in
(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state
(3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered — and
which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered — in the
forum state. 29

The effects test is one example of the alternatives to the
single publication rule found in the United States. However, some courts focused too heavily on the effects portion of the test, failing to strictly require the intent.
Under this interpretation, the test ‘‘can be difficult to
contain’’. 30 Such loose readings were rejected by the
Ninth Circuit in Panavision, where the Court found
jurisdiction to be proper under the effects test because
the defendant, ‘‘as he knew [his conduct] likely would,
had the effect of injuring Panavision in California where
Panavision has its principal place of business’’. 31 The
Ninth Circuit’s use of the effects test in Panavision is
interesting, because the same Court found the effects test
to be inapplicable in Cybersell less than one year earlier.
In Cybersell, the Court considered both tests. The
Court refused to apply the effects test, because the defendant in Cybersell did not purposefully avail itself of the
forum. Instead, the Court used the interactivity test, characterized the offending Web site as a passive site, and
refused jurisdiction. However, given that the effects test
requires purposeful availment in the sense that actions
must be intentional and expressly aimed at the forum
state, the Court’s finding of a lack of jurisdiction is consistent with the application of the effects test. The Court
did not need to state that the effects test was inapplicable, but rather that it was not met.
The case that best reveals the confusion plaguing
the effects and interactivity tests is Revell v. Lidov, 32 a
case addressing a defamation claim. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in December 2002 rejected
the dichotomy between the effects test and interactivity
test, stating, ‘‘Nor is the Zippo scale, as has been suggested, in tension with the ‘effects’ test of Calder v. Jones
for intentional torts’’. 33 The Court found that both tests
are facets of the purposeful availment criteria, and that
most cases conclude that a Web site does not constitute
purposeful availment unless it targets a particular jurisdiction or a particular person. However, the Court
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admitted the possibility that a Zippo passive Web site
could satisfy the effects test by intentionally availing itself
of a forum. 34 Perhaps to escape this conundrum, the
Court characterized the Web site as Zippo-interactive
and then used the effects test to analyse whether or not
jurisdiction was appropriate. In this case, the Court
found that jurisdiction was not appropriate, because the
defamatory article did not mention that the plaintiff
lived in Texas, did not discuss the plaintiff’s activities in
Texas, and was not directed at Texas readers. Thus, the
Court concluded that the article did not focus on Texas
enough to purposefully enter that jurisdiction, despite
the fact that the defamed person lived in Texas and had
a reputation there.
This result is interesting in light of Gutnick, and in
light of several comments made by the Fifth Circuit
about the nature of defamation and the Internet. First,
the Court in Revell stated that defamation is similar to
other torts in response to the plaintiff’s request that the
Court reject Zippo on the basis of the unique nature of
defamation. The Court added, ‘‘Defamation has its
unique features, but shares relevant characteristics with
various business torts’’. 35 This conclusion is similar to
that found in Gutnick and Pro-C, both of which suggest
that torts are similar enough to each other to provide a
stable lens through which to analyse jurisdiction, while
permitting small variations to take into account the idiosyncratic nature of each tort.
Furthermore, in some aspects, the effects test as it is
applied in Revell is similar to the tort-focused approach
adopted in Gutnick. Instead of focusing on the medium
through which the tort is committed, the effects test
looks for intentional actions expressly aimed at a particular forum causing harm in a jurisdiction that is reasonably foreseeable. The Gutnick approach examines the
tort of defamation, and finds that the damage or effects
of defamation are reasonably foreseeable in jurisdictions
in which the plaintiff has a reputation. However, there
are two differences between the effects test and the tortfocused approach. The effects test requires a high level of
intent to meet the constitutionally entrenched defendant-oriented approach in the United States. The tortfocused approach allows more flexibility with respect to
intent, so that jurisdiction is appropriate in a tort which
does not require express aiming at a jurisdiction, but
rather at a person, such as defamation. Thus, the tortfocused approach would not lead to the absurd result in
Revell, where a plaintiff would have succeeded if the
article defaming him included the name of the jurisdiction in which he resided, but failed because that one
word was lacking. Instead of requiring an express mention or aim at the jurisdiction, the tort-focused approach
recognizes that a reputation exists in the knowledge of
other people, and that generally the people who hold
that knowledge are also aware of the residence of the
defamed person because those people have contact with
the defamed person during that person’s regular activi-

ties. Thus, the defamer targets the specific jurisdiction in
which the reputation exists by targeting the reputation.

A Change of Direction: Following
Gutnick’s Lead

T

he second difference between the effects test and
the tort-focused test in Gutnick illuminates the first
reason supporting the Canadian choice of the Gutnick
approach over the American effects or interactivity tests.
This difference is that, at a fundamental level, the effects
test and the tort-focused test begin their analysis from a
different context. Both tests have at their centre a concern about jurisdiction. However, the effects test requires,
rather arbitrarily, intentional action and damage, regardless of the nature of the activity in question. In essence,
the effects test asks: Should we take jurisdiction over this
defendant? The tort-focused approach places the jurisdictional question in the context of the dispute, asking:
Should we take jurisdiction over this dispute between
the plaintiff and the defendant? The distinction may
seem trivial. The result is not. At a principled level, the
courts exist to resolve disputes; therefore, focusing on the
defendant rather than the dispute does not sit well with
the fundamental purpose of courts. It is possible to argue
that the defendant has the most at stake in the process;
perhaps this is true in the criminal setting. However, in
the civil setting, the dispute concerns who should bear
the loss or the cost of the defendant’s actions. Therefore,
both parties have the same loss at stake. Jurisdictional
rules recognize this difference between civil and criminal
actions. Given that a judgment in a civil case will have an
economically detrimental effect on the losing party, be
that party the plaintiff or the defendant, predicating jurisdiction on the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction
is odd, particularly when a multiplicity of doctrines exist
to address abuse of process by the plaintiff in his or her
choice of the original forum.
The difficulty of focusing on the defendant rather
than on the tort becomes apparent when courts take
tests based on the defendant and developed in the context of one tort, and transfer those tests to another tort.
For example, the interactivity test was developed in the
context of trademark infringement. In this context, given
that trademark infringement does not require intent to
infringe, the passive/active dichotomy may act as a good
proxy for purposeful availment of another forum. However, transferring this test into the defamation context, as
occurred in Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 36 leads to troublesome results. In Barrett, the Court found that because
the Internet activity in question was passive, the defendant had not purposefully availed himself of the jurisdiction. 37 As discussed above, in defamation, such logic is
fallacious because targeting the reputation necessarily
targets the jurisdiction in which the reputation exists.
The same difficulty arises with the effects test, which
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requires intentional actions expressly aimed at the forum
state. This test more coherently addresses defamation, a
tort that contains some element of intent, than it does a
strict liability tort such as trademark infringement. If the
courts had in the first instance focused on the tort in
question and not on the defendant’s relationship with
the forum, the courts would have recognized the weaknesses inherent in both the interactivity and the effects
tests.

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

[T]he Supreme Court of Victoria in Gutnick, supra, applied
a real and substantial connection test to conclude that it was
the appropriate forum for deciding a defamation action in
respect of material uploaded onto the defendant’s server in
New Jersey and downloaded by end users in Victoria.

Thus, a Canadian appellate court recognized that
the Australian approach is concordant with Canadian
jurisprudence.

Focusing on the tort instead of on the defendant’s
contacts has several benefits. First, it results in technology-neutral rules. Technology-neutral tests lead to
greater certainty and more principled results because the
court is not required to delve into the minutiae of technological developments to assess whether or not a test is
met. For example, under the passive/active distinction,
the court may be asked to assess whether or not and
how the Web site used cookies, facts that are completely
irrelevant to a defamation action. Furthermore, in an era
where technology progresses as rapidly as it does today, a
test developed in a case based on facts that occurred
more than 18 months before the trial is already out of
date. Secondly, focusing on the tort allows the court to
articulate principles of jurisdiction more generally,
because the analysis for each tort begins with the foundational principles of jurisdiction. A defendant-based
approach assumes that the defendant must have contacts
with the jurisdiction, without articulating why those
contacts must exist. Thus, it is difficult to predict which
contacts are sufficient because the original spirit or the
underlying purpose of the test is lost or altered in the
successive iterations of common law judgments. Not
only does the tort-focused approach require such basic
principles, but it also leads to greater clarity and predictability as a result.

The Ontario Court of Appeal signalled a similar
recognition in Pro-C Ltd., and suggested a tort-based
approach to jurisdiction on the Internet instead of
relying on the effects and interactivity tests. There are
cases adopting the interactivity test and the effects test in
Canada; these cases make the error of using American
tests to decide whether or not the Canadian substantial
connection test is met without adjusting the tests to take
into account the defendant-oriented bias built into the
tests. 40 However, the fact that the courts misapplied the
American case law does not lead to the conclusion that
the tests could not be adjusted to take into account
Canadian jurisdictional values. Such an adjustment
would require rewriting the tests to conform to Canadian law and to eliminate the confusion between the
effects and interactivity tests. If the courts are to rewrite
the test, it makes more sense to start from a solid foundation than from a flawed and confused set of cases. Such a
foundation is provided in Pro-C Ltd. The Ontario Court
of Appeal refused to adopt the American cases because
they were irrelevant to the trademark legislation in question. In so doing, and in its statements in obiter, the
Court demonstrated sensitivity to the nature of the claim
and the relationship between the claim and asserting
jurisdiction. This case is consistent with the sentiments
expressed in Gutnick, and provides some persuasive
authority for adopting the Australian decision.

The second reason for adopting Gutnick instead of
an American approach is more pragmatic: The Australian approach to jurisdiction is similar to the Canadian
approach. In Australia, a plaintiff can serve a foreign party
under service ex juris rules; before that party can proceed
with the case, it must prove to a court that the service
was properly effected and that the claim falls within the
service ex juris rules. At the same time, the defendant can
present a forum non conveniens challenge to the proceeding. Not only does the Australian court use a similar
forum non conveniens analysis based on the House of
Lords decision in Spiliada, 38 but the court also takes a
more balanced approach to jurisdiction than American
courts, which are forced into a defendant-oriented position. Like Canadian courts, Australian courts assess the
plaintiff’s contacts with the forum, the nature of the
claim, hardships to the plaintiff, and hardships to the
defendant. The Federal Court of Appeal recognized this
similarity in Society of Composers, Authors & Music
Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers 39 by discussing the ratio of Gutnick in Canadian
jurisdictional language. Justice Evans stated:

The final reason supporting a Canadian adoption of
Gutnick is the similarity of Canadian and Australian tort
law, particularly in the area of defamation. At the level of
principle, both Australia and Canada emphasize the
value of freedom of expression. Both also recognize that
‘‘A democratic society . . . has an interest in ensuring that
its members can enjoy and protect their good reputation
so long as it is merited’’. 41 Furthermore, neither Canada
nor Australia has adopted a single publication rule. 42
Therefore, an approach to jurisdiction in defamation
cases predicated upon at least similar law, such as that
used in Gutnick, better integrates with the Canadian
balance between free speech and the protection of reputations than an American approach could do. At the level
of doctrine, several pre-Internet cases in Canada
addressing the problem of jurisdiction in cross-border
defamation claims used a similar reputation-oriented
approach to locate the tort of defamation. Instead of
relying on the place of broadcast, as Dow Jones urged in
Gutnick, the Ontario Court in Jenner v. Sun Oil 43 found
it startling to think that ‘‘one may, while standing south
of the border . . . , through the medium of modern sound
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amplification, utter defamatory matter which is heard in
a Province in Canada north of the border, and not be
said to have published a slander in the Province in which
it is heard and understood’’. 44 Justice McRuer clearly
found that the tort was located where the reputation was
damaged because the ‘‘tort consists in making a third
person understand actionable defamatory matter’’. 45 This
jurisprudence is consistent with the approach taken in
Gutnick.

Areas for Further Research

A

lthough the tort-based approach avoids the
problems of technological bias and lack of principled analysis, it may create others, all of which must be
examined more closely. Dow Jones complained that a
tort-based approach would lead to any person on the
Internet being liable in every jurisdiction for a particular
action. First, the above discussion suggests that a tortsbased approach is rigorous enough to eliminate overbroad jurisdiction. It is, perhaps, more rigorous than the
international community requires, given the plaintiff
focus of the Brussels Convention. 46 Coupled with
common law doctrines preventing abuse of process,
including those that prevent a multiplicity of actions, the
torts-based analysis will lead to appropriate jurisdictional
decisions. Furthermore, once a court assumes jurisdiction, there are many ways to express the comity that
informs Canadian jurisdictional rules. For example,
choice of law allows multiple laws to be applied to conduct, including the law of the defendant’s jurisdiction.
Also, local enforcement mechanisms for foreign judgments, particularly in Canada, require that the original
court have assumed jurisdiction in a reasonable manner
based upon a substantial connection with the case. Even
if such jurisdiction is appropriately taken, Canadian
courts can refuse to enforce a judgment based on public
policy. Thus, laws that Canadians would view as deeply
repugnant will not be enforced in Canada, and assets in
Canada will be protected from unreasonable judgments.
In the final analysis, Canada and Australia have decided
that a balanced approach to jurisdiction is appropriate in
non-Internet cases. In Gutnick, the Australian High
Court applied that approach to the Internet with the
knowledge that the multiplicity of safeguards protecting
international respect for national sovereignty would also
apply to judgments concerning torts on the Internet.
Canadian courts, mindful of the same safeguards, the
similarities between Australian and Canadian jurisdictional philosophies and defamation doctrines, should
choose the same approach.
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